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Abstract 
The stylized facts of Africa’s urban transition highlight the limitations of traditional economic 
models of urbanization. Recent research has provided evidence that demographic rather than 
economic processes provide a more compelling explanation for observed trends in the region. In 
particular, mortality decline appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
urbanization to occur and a key driver of urban growth more broadly. The accumulation of survey 
data over the past few decades and the development of new geospatial datasets that incorporate 
satellite imagery are facilitating new, more spatially nuanced insights into the dynamics of urban 
population change in the region. This offers opportunity to develop better policies for managing 
urban change than those adopted in the past, which placed a misguided emphasis on 
manipulating migration incentives with little evidence of positive benefits.  
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1. Introduction 
Urbanization has generally been conceptualised as a process driven by the migration of poor 
peasants into cities in search of economic opportunities generated by structural economic 
change. This basic model has been augmented and nuanced somewhat over the last several 
decades, but the prevailing view has been that urbanization is fundamentally driven by the 
location decisions of individuals influenced by economic conditions. It is a simple, intuitive model, 
but it is only partly correct. 
This became apparent in the 1980s and 1990s as economies across sub-Saharan Africa stagnated 
but urban population growth and urbanization persisted. In recent years, attempts to explain this 
apparently mysterious phenomenon of ‘urbanization without growth’ have changed the way the 
process is understood. 
Importantly, the traditional economic models of urbanization are now being augmented with 
historical demographic perspectives. A key weakness of strictly economic models has been the 
omission of explicit attention to demographic fundamentals and context—i.e. birth and death 
rates and how these evolved in response to technological and institutional changes in the 
20th century. Once these are taken into account, the stylized facts of Africa’s urban transition cease 
to be mysterious. 
But there is still much to be learned about the precise mechanics of urban population change in 
Africa. A dearth of reliable, comparable demographic and economic data has impeded efforts to 
account for the relative contribution of urban natural increase, migration and reclassification 
(including rural transformation). This is due in part to conceptual ambiguity with regard to what 
constitutes an 'urban' area, and in part due to limited resources and capacity to collect data. 
Fortunately a renewed interest in understanding urban population trends in Africa (and globally) 
has inspired the development of new datasets that exploit multiple sources, including satellite 
imagery. These, combined with accumulated information from more traditional survey sources, 
offer the promise of new insights into the dynamics of urban population change across the 
continent, which will help to address important knowledge gaps. 
Filling these knowledge gaps is not just of scholarly interest—it is also crucial for developing 
evidence-based policy. From the late 1970s through the 1990s, ill-conceived population policies 
built on flawed assumptions failed to achieve desired results and may even have contributed to 
deteriorating conditions in African towns and cities. Armed with better models and better data, 
there is great potential to develop better policies to harness the economic potential of Africa’s 
urban transition in the 21st century. 
 2. Concepts, data and definitions 
Measuring and analysing urban population trends in Africa is complicated by the fact that there 
is no universal definition of what constitutes an ‘urban’ settlement (Lucas 1997; Montgomery et 
al 2003; Bloom et al 2010). The range of definitions used by national statistical agencies to 
monitor population change reflects various demographic, physical, socioeconomic and political 
understandings of urbanism. For example, many countries use a simple population size threshold 
for classifying a settlement as urban, although these vary widely: in Angola a settlement of more 
than 2,000 people would be classed as urban, whereas Nigeria’s minimum threshold is 20,000. 
Other countries, such as Botswana and Côte d'Ivoire, incorporate a criterion related to the share 
of persons in non-agricultural employment, an approach which reflects a concept of urbanization 
that is intrinsically linked to structural economic change. In other cases wholly subjective criteria 
are applied, such as ‘Places officially designated as urban’ in Zimbabwe. Moreover, there can be 
dramatic differences in living conditions in ‘urban’ settlements as access to basic infrastructure 
varies significantly across countries due to market failures and political economy dynamics (see 
Fox 2014; Collier 2017; Pariente 2017). 
This underlying conceptual variation in settlement classification between countries, and 
sometimes even within countries over time (e.g. Rwanda between the 2002 and 2012 censuses), 
coupled with concerns about the integrity of underlying data, which often represents estimates 
based on very old or controversial census exercises, complicates rigorous empirical analysis of 
urban population trends in Africa. However, census data collection is improving, other household 
survey exercises have accumulated useful time series, and new approaches have emerged that 
exploit remote sensing (e.g. satellite imagery), ancillary data (e.g. non-census household surveys) 
and advanced computational techniques. Examples include the Africapolis project, which has 
published population estimates for all urban agglomerations in West Africa containing 10,000 
people or more between 1950 and 2010 (see Moriconi-Ebrard, Harre and Heinrigs 2016) and the 
WorldPop project (www.worldpop.org.uk), which has published estimates of the total number of 
people per square kilometre for the entire continent of Africa in 2010. A key benefit of these latter 
geospatial datasets is that they present standardised population-based estimates of human 
settlements that permit more rigorous comparison across countries and regions, although the 
larger datasets are still temporally constrained. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, they are 
already facilitating novel insights into Africa’s urban transition. 
A second conceptual issue that has led to confusion relates to the use of the term ‘urbanization’ 
itself and the difference between this and the related (but distinct) phenomena of urban growth 
and urban expansion. The term ‘urbanization’ is used here in a strictly demographic sense to 
denote an increase in the proportion of a population residing in urban areas. However, in both 
research and policy communities it is common for the term ‘urbanization’ to be used to describe 
variously the process of rural-urban migration, an increase in the sheer number of people living 
in cities, or the expansion of built up areas. From an analytical point of view it is important to 
distinguish between changes in population ratios and changes in population size, and changes in 
the extent of physically built up areas. This is particularly true in Africa, where the rate of urban 
population growth—i.e. increase in the absolute number of people in urban areas—is truly 
unprecedented, whereas rates of changes in levels of urbanization have been robust but not 
exceptionally fast in many countries. 
The conceptual conflation of urban growth with urbanization has real consequences: failure to 
distinguish between the two has often led to the belief that migration rather than natural increase 
is the primary cause of mushrooming towns and cities. Consequently, policies aimed at reducing 
population pressure in urban areas have focused almost exclusively on discouraging migration, 
with little observable impact (Fox 2014). A more nuanced understanding of the underlying forces 
driving urban population growth and urbanization is necessary if we are to identify effective 
interventions to promote human development.   
 
3. Africa’s urban transition in historical perspective 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban transition is characterised by two stylized facts illustrated in Table 1. 
First, urban populations in countries across the region have been growing at historically 
unprecedented rates since the 1960s. Second, the urban share of the region’s population (i.e. level 
of urbanization) has grown persistently, even during periods of sustained economic stagnation 
(and in many countries contraction) in the 1980s and 1990s. This latter phenomenon, dubbed 
‘urbanization without growth’ (Fay and Opal 2000), has motivated researchers to revisit core 
assumptions about the factors that drive urban population change. 
Urbanization has traditionally been understood as an integral part of the process of economic 
development. Drawing on the historical experience of European countries, early development 
scholars modelled urbanization as a response to the growth of jobs in manufacturing and 
industry, which ‘pull’ people off of farms and into cities, thereby increasing the share of the total 
population living in urban areas (Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961). Simply put, urbanization was 
assumed to be a by-product of structural changes in labour markets associated with 
industrialisation. 
Table 1 | Urban growth, urbanization and GDP per capita by major world region, 1970-2010 
 1970-1990  1990-2010 
Urban 
growth 
rate 
Urbanizati
on rate 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
rate 
 
Urban 
growth 
rate 
Urbanizati
on rate 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
rate 
        
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.79 2.02 -0.32  4.04 1.33 1.06 
South Asia 3.78 1.47 1.84  2.88 1.07 4.10 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
3.25 1.06 1.46  2.01 0.54 1.67 
East Asia & Pacific 3.24 1.52 3.24  3.12 2.16 3.04 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
4.29 1.26 1.18  2.73 0.65 2.12 
Notes: Data are from World Development Indicators database online, accessed September 2016. All 
estimates are compound average annual growth rates. 
 
In an effort to understand how countries might urbanize without such structural change Gollin, 
Jedwab and Vollrath (2016) have built and empirically tested a model that focuses on the effects 
of income shocks rather than broad structural changes in production. They find that rising income 
is associated with urbanization, but there are large differences in the composition of employment 
between countries that rely heavily on natural resource exports for income and those that do not. 
Resource exporters tend to generate ‘consumption cities’ in which a large share of the workforce 
is engaged in non-tradable services, while countries that do not rely on natural resource exports 
are more likely to have cities with workers employed in tradable services, manufacturing and 
industry. This model helps to explain how urbanization can happen without broad-based 
industrialisation—a pattern that fits with the experience of many resource-dependent African 
economies. However, this still cannot account for persistent urbanization in the face of stagnant 
or declining income observed in many countries across the region. Explaining this phenomenon 
demands a critical reconsideration of the underlying assumptions in standard economic models 
of urbanization.   
While economic models emphasise the role that rural-urban wage gaps play in driving migration 
(and hence urbanization), it became clear as early as the 1950s that urban population growth in 
many developing countries seemed to be outpacing the growth of formal employment 
opportunities in urban areas (see Fox 2012). This led Haris and Todaro (1970) to adjust the 
classic model to account for the inflated expectations of potential migrants and argued for 
migration control measures to boost aggregate welfare, which were widely adopted. However, 
further research revealed that people were being ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ into urban areas for a wide 
range of other reasons, such as rural poverty, population pressure, conflict, to escape 
discrimination or repression, to diversify household income streams, to meet potential husbands 
or wives, and even simply to find excitement and adventure (see Byerlee 1974, Mazumdar 1987, 
Jamal and Weeks 1988, Becker and Morrison 1995; Lucas 1997; Fay and Opal 2000; Barrios, 
Bertinelli and Strobl 2006).  
This wide range of potential motives for migration reveals the inherent limitations of models that 
rely on wage differentials to account for population trends and helps to explain why these models 
have consistently failed to adequately fit the available data (see Mazumdar 1987; Jamal and 
Weeks 1988; Weeks 1995; Becker and Morrison 1995, Fay and Opal 2000, Lall, Selod and Shalizi 
2006; de Haas 2010). While it is possible to build more complex models that incorporate the 
diverse range of motives behind population movements, this may not be the most fruitful line of 
enquiry for those seeking to understand urban population trends—especially given the 
associated measurement challenges. Indeed, an overemphasis on the role of migration in driving 
urbanization has tended to obscure other critical factors shaping urban population trends in 
Africa.  
If we instead begin by assuming that there are always some people looking to relocate from rural 
to urban areas, and that the number of people so motivated consistently exceeds the number 
looking to move from urban to rural areas, we are left with a very different line of enquiry.1 
The traditional approach seeks to explain why urbanization happens. If we accept this idea of a 
‘migration constant’—i.e. a base rate of drift from rural to urban areas—we are left instead with 
the question of why urbanization didn’t happen sooner. Cities have existed for roughly 6000 
years, but it is only in the last few hundred years that the global proportion of people living in 
urban areas began to increase (Bairoch 1988; Dyson 2011; Fox 2012; Jedwab and Vollrath 2015). 
What prevented urbanization from happening earlier? The answer provided by demographers 
and historians both confirms the validity of an assumed ‘migration constant’ and provides a useful 
framework for explaining the stylized facts of Africa’s urban transition. 
Prior to the industrial revolution large towns and cities were mostly ‘demographic sinks’: death 
rates exceeded birth rates due to the scourges of disease and periodic famine. As a result, the very 
survival of cities depended on a steady flow of migrants to replenish urban populations, even 
when these migrants were likely to die young. However, by the middle of the 20th century cities 
                                                             
1 Economic and social incentives for rural-urban migration can be assumed to be greater, on average, than 
the incentives to migrate from urban to rural areas. From an economic point of view, larger settlements 
present greater and more diverse opportunities for employment, entrepreneurship and access productive 
services and amenities. Similarly, the social consequences of agglomeration include greater choice of 
friends, potential partners, communities and cultural experiences. These are structural differences 
between small human settlements and large ones. 
had ceased to be so deadly thanks to improvements in disease control and food security (Bairoch 
1988; Dyson 2011; Fox 2012).  
In Europe, sustained mortality decline coincided with the onset of the industrial revolution. 
Improvements in medical knowledge and technology, investments in public infrastructure, and 
significant gains in both agricultural productivity and cost-effective transport all contributed to 
increased life expectancy at a time when manufacturing and industry flourished. 
By contrast, sustained mortality decline across much of Africa in the latter half of the 20th century 
occurred largely independently of broad-based economic development.  Accumulated medical 
knowledge and technologies (e.g. vaccines and antibiotics) were transferred in the late colonial 
and early postcolonial eras, which also witnessed a substantial increase in investments in public 
infrastructure, health services and education (see Fox 2012). While some improvements in 
mortality were linked to rising income and productivity, many were not. As a result, morality 
decline became decoupled from broad-based economic development in the mid-20th century. This 
decoupling broke the previously observed empirical link between economic prosperity and 
urban population size by region (Jedwab and Vollrath 2015) and lifted the upper boundary on 
city size. Prior to 1800 there were no human settlements with populations larger than 1.5 million; 
by 2014 there were an estimated 488 cities with 1 million or more inhabitants, and 28 of these 
had more than 10 million residents (United Nations 2015).  
Against this backdrop the phenomenon of ‘urbanization without growth’ in Africa no longer 
seems mysterious.  The acute economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s were not generally 
accompanied by a reversal in mortality decline and so towns and cities continued to grow. Where 
mortality rates reversed trend and rose there is some evidence that rates urbanization also 
slowed or went into reverse (Dyson 2003; Fox 2012).  The stylized facts of Africa’s urban 
transition therefore fit the hypothesis that mortality decline is both a necessary and even 
sufficient condition for urbanization to occur. Where towns able to reproduce themselves and 
grow through natural increase, migrants contribute to the steady march of urbanization; and with 
rural populations growing in response to mortality decline, the pool of potential migrants is 
expanding.  
A growing body of research has shown that urban natural increase is in fact the majority 
component of urban growth in developing countries, and particularly in Africa (Preston 1979; 
Jedwab, Christiaensen and Gindelsky 2014; United Nations 2015). In other words, even if there 
were no migration, towns and cities in Africa would continue to grow rapidly from within. This 
highlights the problem with the traditional assumption (particularly among policy makers) that 
migration is the primary source of demographic pressure in urban Africa: in most places natural 
increase accounts for a greater share of urban growth than migration does.  
A useful illustration of the flawed assumptions underpinning standard thinking about 
urbanization is the ecological fallacy associated with the classic cross-sectional plot of income and 
urbanization. By way of example, Figure 1 provides two scatterplots overlaid on one another. The 
first is of GDP per capita and level of urbanization for the 10 largest countries in West Africa for 
the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 (left axis). The second is life expectancy and 
urbanization for the same countries and years (right axis). The sample of countries was chosen 
for convenience to facilitate comparison with data presented below.  
 
Figure 1 | Income, life expectancy and urbanization in West Africa, 1970-2010 
 
 
 
Both income and life expectancy are clearly positively and significantly correlated with 
urbanization in this cross-sectional plot. However, causality should not be assumed. This becomes 
clear in Figures 2 and 3 which provide time-path plots of the relationship between income and 
urbanization and life expectancy and urbanization. Each line proceeds through time from left to 
right, with the first data point for each line representing 1970 and the last representing 2010. 
Figure 2 shows that the assumed causal correlation between income and urbanization does not 
hold at the individual country level: six out of ten countries experienced protracted episodes of 
negative income growth with rising levels of urbanization. The correlation observed in the classic 
income-urbanization plot is more likely a reflection of historical processes rather than causality 
(see Easterlin 2013). 
Figures 3 shows a very different pattern. Here the correlation between life expectancy and 
urbanization holds at the individual country level with just two brief exceptions: Cote d’Ivoire 
and Togo experienced declining life expectancy but increased levels of urbanization between 
1990 and 2000. In the former, survey data from the Demographic and Health Programme (DHS) 
indicate that under-5 mortality rates rose in the 1990s in both rural and urban areas, but more 
quickly in rural areas. This might account for the persistent increase in the proportion of people 
living in urban areas, but more research is needed to explain these anomalies. 
 
Figure 2 | Time-path plot of income and urbanization, 1970-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 | Time-path plot of life expectancy and urbanization, 1970-2010 
 
 
While clearly not definitive, these graphs are illustrative of the broader argument: mortality 
decline (or increased life expectancy) is more convincingly associated with changes in 
urbanization than income growth. This is not to discount the significance of economic factors in 
shaping migration choices and the pace of urbanization in a country, but when viewed over the 
long run it is clear that demographic processes are more likely driving urbanization in Africa than 
economic ones.  
 
4. New data, new insights 
Indeed, the tenuous correlation between income and urbanization has become even more 
apparent with the advent of geospatial population datasets that facilitate a standardised 
approach to estimating the size of urban populations across countries. For example, in a recent 
conference paper Deuskar and Stewart (2016) presented standardized estimates of urbanization 
for a large sample of countries based solely on the population size and density of human 
settlements drawing on two separate gridded population datasets. They find ‘no clear 
relationship between national GDP per capita and the proportion of a country’s population that 
resides in settlements of ‘urban’-like size and density’ (ibid, 9). However, the authors caution 
against jumping to conclusions, as some would likely contest the validity of defining urban areas 
using their criteria. However, a similar finding emerges when the same exercise is run with the 
Africapolis data mentioned above. 
The Africapolis project classifies a settlement as ‘urban’ if it contains a population of 10,000 or 
more, which is a fairly conservative threshold by global standards. Using this uniform approach 
to settlement classification the Africapolis dataset contains decadal estimates of the number of 
urban settlements, the size of each settlement and the total urban and rural population for 17 
countries in West Africa between 1950 and 2010. The simple pooled cross-sectional correlation 
between GDP per capita and urbanization using these population estimates is positive, but the R-
squared is .189; yet the correlation between life expectancy and urbanization remains 
significantly higher with an R-squared of .438. 
This dataset also illustrates the significance of a largely overlooked dynamic of urban population 
change: rural transformation. The traditional two-sector mode of thinking about urbanization 
obscures the fact that entirely new towns and cities are emerging across Africa. As Table 2 shows, 
the number of identifiably urban settlements in West Africa increased from just 157 in 1950 to 
1947 in 2010. Some are effectively satellite settlements in what are recognizable metropolitan 
regions centred around long-standing urban settlements, but many are not. For example, in 
Ghana the town of Akatsi in the Volta Region grew from an estimated population of just 1600 in 
1960 to over 25,000 in 2010. Similarly, Agaie in Niger State, Nigeria had an estimated urban 
population of 0 in 1970 and over 33,000 in 2010. Both of these settlements are independent of 
any recognizable metropolitan region; in both cases an urban settlement has emerged in 
previously rural landscapes. While these changes would be captured statistically as instances of 
‘reclassification’, it is nevertheless useful to have some idea of the contribution of new settlement 
emergence to overall urban growth, as these have different political-institutional and economic 
needs than existing settlements experiencing further expansion. At present, there is no standard 
approach to monitoring emergent urban settlements. 
New insights are also possible thanks to the accumulation of evidence from household surveys 
over the past few decades. While access to detailed census data remains a challenge in many 
African countries, there are now several decade’s worth of high quality surveys available from 
other sources, which offer scope to flesh out the demographic mechanics of urban population 
change. For example, there has been very little research on urban natural increase despite a 
general awareness among demographers that it is likely the largest contributor to urban 
population growth in many countries.  Yet evidence from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) Program hint at some important trends.  
 Table 2 | Number of urban settlements by country in West Africa, 1950-2010 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Benin 4 7 9 20 26 41 81 
Burkina Faso 3 4 6 16 30 53 82 
Cabo Verde 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 
Chad 3 4 9 14 25 37 75 
Côte d'Ivoire 3 9 29 54 76 119 166 
Ghana 11 33 48 61 86 124 173 
Guinea 5 7 11 16 21 31 39 
Guinea-Bissau 1 1 1 2 3 3 6 
Liberia 1 1 5 14 14 14 23 
Mali 5 5 14 18 24 43 71 
Mauritania 0 0 4 7 15 12 16 
Niger 3 4 6 10 24 38 51 
Nigeria 99 209 310 480 584 792 1020 
Senegal 8 9 14 27 35 44 57 
Sierra Leone 2 4 7 10 12 16 19 
The Gambia 1 1 1 3 4 9 10 
Togo 2 5 17 16 23 38 54 
West Africa 152 305 493 770 1004 1417 1947 
Source: Moriconi-Ebrard, Harre & Heinrigs (2016) 
 
 
Table 3 shows crude birth rates, estimated crude death rates and rates of natural increase broken 
down by rural and urban residence for 23 countries for which data from three survey rounds or 
more are available. Crude death rates are not reported by the DHS Programme so the figures 
shown are estimates based upon reported infant mortality rates (see Appendix for details of the 
estimation procedure). The final column of the table shows the difference between rural and 
urban rates of natural increase (i.e. births minus deaths).  
 
Although the figures should be treated with caution given that the crude death rate has been 
estimated, several important observations can be made. First, urban birth rates remain relatively 
high in most Africa countries, with an average of 32.8 in the latest survey round. By comparison, 
Bangladesh registered an urban CBR or 20.8 in 2014; Pakistan a rate of 27 in 2013; and India 18.8 
in 2006 (the latest year for which DHS data are available). High birth rates translate into higher 
rates of urban growth and may also have implications for poverty reduction. 
Table 3 | Birth rates, estimated death rates and natural increase by rural and urban residence 
Country 
Survey 
year 
Urban  Rural  Rural NI-
Urban NI 
CBR CDR NI  CBR CDR NI  
Benin 
2001 36 10 26  44 14 30  3.96 
2006 39 9 29  43 11 32  2.44 
2011/12 33 6 27  33 7 26  -0.79 
Burkina Faso 
1998/99 32 10 22  45 19 26  4.12 
2003 30 11 19  42 15 27  7.63 
2010 33 9 24  43 13 31  6.18 
Cameroon 
1998 31 12 19  38 15 23  4.01 
2004 35 13 22  41 16 25  2.78 
2011 35 11 23  41 14 27  4.37 
Chad 
1996/97 43 16 27  47 19 28  1.69 
2004 42 16 26  45 20 25  -1.07 
2014/15 36 13 23  42 14 28  5.28 
Cote D'Ivoire 
1994 36 14 22  40 18 23  0.63 
1998/99 37 16 21  42 21 21  -0.10 
2011/12 32 13 19  40 15 25  6.31 
Ethiopia 
2000 28 15 13  41 17 23  10.31 
2005 23 11 13  37 13 25  11.82 
2011 26 10 17  36 12 24  7.45 
Ghana 
2003 27 10 17  37 11 25  8.70 
2008 27 9 18  34 10 24  5.85 
2014 28 9 19  33 9 24  5.18 
Guinea 
1999 33 13 20  39 18 21  0.48 
2005 32 13 19  41 18 22  3.62 
2012 29 9 20  36 13 23  2.52 
Kenya 
2003 35 13 22  38 16 22  -0.45 
2008/09 33 13 19  35 12 23  3.70 
2014 31 10 21  30 9 21  -0.16 
Lesotho 
2004 19 13 6  27 18 8  2.50 
2009 25 15 9  27 18 9  0.04 
2014 23 15 9  25 14 11  1.83 
Madagascar 
1997 35 12 23  45 16 29  6.50 
2003/4 29 10 18  37 11 26  7.54 
2008/09 25 7 18  35 12 23  5.47 
Malawi 
2000 41 14 26  46 19 27  0.82 
2004 37 11 26  43 17 27  1.28 
2010 36 13 23  40 13 27  3.80 
Mali 
2001 42 16 26  46 20 26  -0.52 
2006 42 12 30  47 19 28  -1.84 
2012/13 37 5 31  39 9 30  -1.75 
Mozambique 
1997 38 15 23  40 21 19  -3.85 
2003 36 15 21  42 18 24  2.77 
2011 37 12 25  43 13 31  5.73 
Namibia 
2000 30 6 24  31 10 20  -3.86 
2006/07 29 10 19  30 13 17  -2.05 
2013 30 7 23  29 11 19  -4.19 
Niger 
1998 42 13 29  54 24 30  0.65 
2006 42 10 31  47 16 30  -1.21 
2012 39 7 32  48 11 37  4.85 
Nigeria 
2003 36 14 22  45 18 26  4.10 
2008 37 13 24  43 15 27  2.83 
2013 35 12 23  42 15 28  5.03 
Rwanda 
2007/08 37 9 28  40 12 27  -0.65 
2010 31 9 21  35 10 25  3.71 
2014/15 34 7 27  32 8 24  -3.18 
Senegal 
2010/11 32 7 25  42 9 32  6.80 
2012/13 33 6 27  43 9 34  7.46 
2014 33 5 29  42 7 34  5.53 
Tanzania 
1999 34 16 19  44 20 24  5.61 
2004/05 35 13 21  45 15 30  8.32 
2010 35 12 23  39 11 28  4.59 
Uganda 
2000/01 41 12 30  48 17 31  1.61 
2006 41 13 28  45 16 30  2.08 
2011 40 12 29  42 13 29  0.53 
Zambia 
2001/02 37 15 21  47 20 27  5.56 
2007 36 16 21  48 16 31  10.84 
2013/14 32 10 23  40 10 30  7.55 
Zimbabwe 
1999 31 9 22  31 21 10  -12.22 
2005/6 29 9 20  32 12 20  0.89 
2010/11 34 13 21  34 14 20  -0.80 
Notes: Crude birth rate data are from the DHS Programme access online September 2016. Crude death 
rates were calculated from the infant mortality rates reported by the DHS programme. The methodology 
for this calculation is outlined in the Appendix. 
 
Second, in 15 of 23 cases urban birth rates increased rather than decreased between survey 
rounds. In Ghana, urban birth rates appear to have been rising persistently since a recorded nadir 
in the mid-1990s, and many other countries have experienced some type of urban fertility bump 
in the past 20 years. Why does urban fertility remain high and in some cases appear to have 
revered trends and started to rise? The answer may lie in changing ages structures associated 
with in-migration of young people, or it may reflect other socioeconomic or public health 
dynamics that have yet to be identified.  
Third, urban populations are growing nearly as fast as rural populations across the continent—
in some cases faster. In 17 out of the 69 country-years reported in Table 3 urban natural increase 
exceeded rural natural increase. In these contexts urbanization could be occurring even in the 
absence of any rural-urban migration. In some countries, such as Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda 
and Zimbabwe this under-researched phenomenon appears in multiple survey years. Even in 
countries where rural natural increase is greater than urban natural increase the difference is 
generally not large, which means that even very low rates of rural-urban migration could drive 
urbanization. These observations highlight the importance of understanding the underlying 
determinants of fertility and mortality rates across settlement types if we are to fully urban 
growth trajectories in Africa. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that economic factors influence migration patterns and contribute to urban 
population change—one need only look to China to see the power of economic opportunity to 
drive mass migration. But an excessive theoretical and empirical emphasis on economically 
motivated migration as the primary explanation for urbanization has distracted attention from 
equally important historical demographic forces. Moreover, in many respects it makes more 
sense to focus on understanding the drivers and patterns of urban growth rather than 
urbanization if the purpose of monitoring population change is to inform evidence-based policy. 
It is urban growth—not urbanization—that ultimately determines the required number of 
houses, jobs, sewerage treatment plants etc. that need to be created to meet human development 
objectives. And focusing on urban growth rather than urbanization yields a more nuanced 
perspective on spatial-demographic change.  
In sub-Saharan Africa mortality decline has made rapid urban growth and persistent urbanization 
possible even in the face of economic stagnation and decline. While migration is no doubt an 
important component of urban growth, urban natural increase and rural transformation are 
almost certainly more significant. As more data become available we should be able to develop 
increasingly sophisticated and spatially nuanced understandings of urban population change that 
transcend the crude rural-urban dichotomy that has dominated monitoring in the past.   
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Appendix 
Estimating crude death rates by residence from infant mortality data 
The DHS Programme reports crude birth rates (CBR) by residence but does not report crude 
death rates (CDR), which are required to calculate rates of natural increase (NI) by residence. In 
order to estimate crude death rates by residence data on infant mortality rates and crude death 
rates at the national level between 1989 and 2014 were compiled for each country from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators database online, accessed November 2016. For each 
individual country a conversion equation was generated from an ordinary least squares 
regression model. This equation was then used to transform rural and urban infant mortality 
rates into estimated rural and urban death rates. An example of equation generation is shown in 
Figure A1.  
Figure A1. OLS estimate of IMR in Burkina Faso as a function of CDR 1990-2014 
 
However, in many cases there were very noticeable and abrupt changes in trend between 
periods rendering a linear estimation un-useable. In these cases the reference period was 
abbreviated to post-2000 or post-2005 to facilitate linear modelling. As only data for the three 
most recent surveys are reported in Table 3 the truncated reference period was assumed to be 
the most relevant. An example is of this is illustrated in Figures A2 and A3. The equations and 
parameters for estimation for each country are shown in Table A1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A1. OLS estimate of IMR in Cote D’Ivoire as a function of CDR 1990-2014 
 
 
 
Figure A1. OLS estimate of IMR in Cote D’Ivoire as a function of CDR 2000-2014 
 
  
Table A1 Conversion functions for IMR and CDR based on OLS models for each individual country 
Country 
Estimated function 
CDR → IMR 
Estimated function 
IMR → CDR 
R-
sq. 
Reference 
period 
Benin IMR = 8.0828(CDR) - 9.441 CDR = (IMR+9.441)/8.0828 0.99 1989-2014 
Burkina Faso IMR = 5.2362 (CDR) + 14.68 CDR = (IMR-14.688)/5.2362 0.98 1989-2014 
Cameroon IMR = 8.1475(CDR) - 35.535 CDR = (IMR+35.535)/8.1475 0.99 2005-2014 
Chad IMR = 5.8174(CDR) + 3.2065 CDR = (IMR-3.2065)/5.8174 0.97 1989-2014 
Cote d'Ivoire IMR = 7.6402(CDR) - 34.42 CDR = (IMR+34.42)/7.6402 0.99 2000-2014 
Ethiopia IMR = 7.2193(CDR) - 10.818 CDR = (IMR+10.818)/7.2193 0.99 1989-2014 
Ghana  IMR = 10.738(CDR) - 50.96 CDR = (IMR+50.96)/10.738 0.98 2000-2014 
Guinea IMR = 6.6974(CDR) - 5.4641 CDR = (IMR+5.4641)/6.6974 0.96 2000-2014 
Kenya IMR = 5.5462(CDR) - 10.405 CDR = (IMR+10.405)/5.5462 0.98 2000-2014 
Lesotho IMR = 4.6899(CDR) + 1.4637 CDR = (IMR-1.4637)/4.6899 0.92 2000-2014 
Madagascar IMR = 7.2787(CDR) - 9.0169 CDR = (IMR+9.0169)/7.2787 0.98 1989-2014 
Malawi IMR = 7.4195(CDR) - 24.537 CDR = (IMR+24.537)/7.4195 0.91 1989-2014 
Mali IMR = 5.8657(CDR) + 12.377 CDR = (IMR-12.377)/5.8657 0.99 1989-2014 
Mozambique IMR = 11.029(CDR)- 66.836 CDR = (IMR+66.836)/11.029 0.99 1989-2014 
Namibia IMR = 3.1526(CDR) + 12.18 CDR = (IMR-12.18)/3.1526 0.98 2000-2014 
Niger IMR = 6.1205(CDR) - 1.4353 CDR = (IMR+1.4353)/6.1205 0.99 1989-2014 
Nigeria IMR = 9.75(CDR) - 56.095 CDR = (IMR+56.095)/9.75 0.98 1989-2014 
Rwanda IMR = 10.142(CDR) - 41.153 CDR = (IMR+41.153)/10.142 0.95 2000-2014 
Senegal IMR = 5.9948(CDR) + 2.86 CDR = (IMR-2.86)/5.9948 0.99 1989-2014 
Tanzania IMR = 6.0616(CDR) - 7.5256 CDR = (IMR+7.5256)/6.0616 0.99 2000-2014 
Uganda IMR = 7.6598(CDR) - 34.479 CDR = (IMR+34.479)/7.6598 0.99 2000-2014 
Zambia IMR = 5.4858(CDR) - 6.6228 CDR = (IMR+6.6228)/5.4858 0.98 2000-2014 
Zimbabwe IMR = 1.5355(CDR) + 33.316 CDR = (IMR-33.316)/1.5355 0.95 2000-2014 
 
 
 
